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IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: A
DIGRESSION
Lucie White*
I. OPENING QUESTIONS

What can be done to teach law students the skills they need to
work, throughout their legal careers, in the interests of justice? How
can the work we do as law teachers motivate law students to take the
possibility of justice seriously throughout their professional lives?
How can our teaching help law students take the hope of justice
seriously, over the long haul, without eventually retreating into
cynicism, denial, or despair?
I. JOB CHANGES

When I decided to go to law school, I was trying to teach lowincome youth to read at a community college in a stressed urban
neighborhood. I had encountered three obstacles to my students'
capacities for effective learning and good citizenship, and I thought
that the law could somehow help us overcome these obstacles. My
students' hope was stymied by the interlocking problems of economic
inequality, social exclusion, and political powerlessness. This knot of
troubles seemed to sap their enthusiasm for learning or civic
involvement. The notion that they were supposed to feel and act like
enfranchised citizens seemed, to these young people, like a message
from Mars.
We all know that poor people have little or no money to pay
lawyers. Thus, when I graduated, I signed up for the obvious job for
someone with my inclinations: working for Legal Aid. Legal Aid
paid rock-bottom salaries. My starting salary, in the fall of 1982, was
approximately $12,000 a year. Even then, my law school classmates
on Wall Street were making a lot more. In order to sit for my state's
bar exam, I had to swear to the Bar Examiners that I had not willfully
defaulted on my law school student loans. This was before the era of
low-income protection plans.
Money, however, was not the only problem I encountered while
working for Legal Aid in that era. The endless forms we had to fill
* Lewis A. Horvitz Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
College; J.D. 1981, Harvard Law School.

1921

B.A. 1971, Radcliffe

1922

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

out to keep track of our clients posed an even greater challenge. The
paperwork was worse than what my sister faced as a first grade
teacher in a Texas public school. And it was almost as bad as what the
welfare workers in my county dealt with.1 The forms and rules were
aimed at restraining us in two ways. First, they made us show them
that our clients actually were poor. And second, they made us swear
we were not getting too bold in our efforts to help them.
There was also the problem of bad vibes on the shop floor. In just
about every Legal Aid office of that era, including my own, the white
guys ran things and handled the important lawsuits. They called these
the "impact" cases. The white women, like me, worked on the high
volume cases, such as evictions, divorces, and welfare terminations.
They called our work the "service" cases. And the black women
handled the high-stress, low-wage clerical and paralegal jobs. The
white women, who had put off having children in order to work long
hours, would often whisper among ourselves that the black women in
the front office seemed to lack the passion that we brought to our
jobs, and we didn't know why.
Finally, there was the law we had to work with; the intricate rules
that made us treat our clients like Bingo cards, intruding into their
lives so we could fill up the boxes to get them some cash.
Thus, five years out of law school, I decided to jump ship on Legal
Aid to teach law. My defection was the result of a cool cost-benefit
calculation: I figured that the subsidy I could get to work with poor
people from inside a law school carried fewer strings than a Legal Aid
wage. I also had the idealistic thought that at a law school, I could
find some young folks to help me. And, after five years at Legal Aid,
I knew that I needed their insight to keep me naYve enough to be
effective.
Through all of this calculation, it hardly crossed my mind that my
job as a law professor would include the task of teaching these young
people "the law." It hardly crossed my mind that I might want to
teach them something about using law to work against injustice. I just
was not thinking about my reasons for moving from Legal Aid
practice into law school teaching in those terms.
III. SUBVERSIONS
As a novice law professor, I wanted to draw my students into

working with low-income people against injustice. At the same time,
however, I felt a gut-level aversion to the notion that this work had
anything to do with "exposing" these students to the "realities" of
poverty. I guess I did not believe in the "reality" of poverty. Nor
could I imagine why such "exposure," if it could be carried out, would
1. Ronald Reagan put most of the paperwork in place. Talk about irony.
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help students become more attuned to the art of working against
injustice. I also rejected the notion that my job should involve
recruiting students to "serve" the poor. I have always felt uneasy
about such missions. My grandmother's people, good Methodist folks
from the hills of Carolina, had dispatched entire families from their
close-knit congregations to the missions they had set up in the Congo.
All I knew for sure, when I started teaching law, was that what I
thought I knew about law and social justice was exactly what I did not
want my students to believe.
That is not quite true. I did want to draw students into working
with low-income people in ways that felt creative, upbeat, and alive.
And I wanted to get across the upside-down notion that being honest
with themselves about the difficulty of the work could be their
greatest source of power. I wanted to teach these students the power,
indeed, the necessity, of critique as the only reliable ground for moral
action.
I have thought a lot over the years about why I am at the same time
such a critic and an activist. When I was working at Legal Aid, I used
to read critical thinkers like Foucault and Derrida to relax. But
contrary to the warnings of the centrist legal academics, who
denounced the first generation of critical legal studies as a path
toward nihilism, asking the kinds of questions that pull the rug out
from under one's own grounds for action has not tied me up in postmodernist paralysis. Especially when the work gets really hard, it is
only these nay-saying, groundbreaking kinds of questions that can
keep it going.
I know that a big part of my romance with critique must come from
my nature.
Call it temperament, or quality of mind, or a
physiologically-based style of perception and cognition. Perhaps, as
Freud said, biology is destiny. 2 Yet, I also think my taste for critique
comes from the world I grew up in-Jim Crow Carolina. That was a
world in which the moral ground never turned out to be quite what it
was cracked up to be. Behind every "scene" there always seemed to
be black people-silent, angry, hurting-but in no position to talk
honestly about what they knew was going on. This was a confusing
kind of moral education for a little white girl: a set-up for learning to
distrust one's own perceptions and convictions, especially the ones
that seemed most undeniably true. I guess all we can do, in the end,
as lawyers and teachers inclined towards the interests of justice, is to
teach from what we know.

2. See, eg., Steven L. Winter, Human Vahes in a Postiodern World, 6 Yale J.L
& Human. 233,246 n.58 (1994).
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IV. FIELD-BASED COURSES
Over the years, I have taught a lot of field-based law school courses.
These are small classes, in which students work with real people in the
places where economic inequality, social exclusion, and political
powerlessness come together. In one of these classes, which I called
"Work Opportunity and Well-Being," a clinical psychologist and I
taught a group of law and medical students who were working with
people who had felt pressured to apply for Supplemental Security
Income ("SSI") disability benefits. These people were unable to find
work they could do in the national economy. As our students took
these people through the demeaning steps of the disability
certification process, they kept journals of what, following Mikhail
Bakhtin, we called "arresting" moments. We explained these as
moments when you are struck by an experience that refuses either to
fit itself into the world that you thought you knew, or to go away.
V. ARRESTING MOMENTS

A few moments from my teaching immediately come to mind as I
write this:
a The scene is the University of North Carolina Law School's Legal
Aid clinic in 1984, at the height of the federal government's campaign
to weed malingerers off of the federal disability rolls. A law student is
representing an elderly African American couple in a claim to
reinstate their SSI disability after an abrupt termination. Both the
husband and wife suffer from severe mental illness. At the end of
their hearing, the couple gives the student a small token of their
gratitude. It is a 45-rpm recording, produced by the couple through a
mail order service, on which they recite love poems that they have
written to each other over their forty-year marriage.
o The scene is Los Angeles in 1989, the hey-day of homelessness.
Law students are working with Vietnam veterans on Venice Beach.
In the early mornings, many of these veterans can be found foraging
for food in the garbage cans along the boardwalk. The students take
food stamp applications from the few hungry men who are willing to
complete them. They probe the others to understand their reasons for
refusing the federal assistance to which they are clearly entitled. One
of the reluctant veterans, interviewed while rummaging through an
overflowing garbage can, explains his choice of foraging over food
stamps in the following terms: "I have too much respect for my own
dignity to set foot in the West L.A. welfare office."
a The scene is Boston, in the winter of 1996-97. A group of law
students, most of them from "historically underrepresented" groups,
work at a local food pantry with elderly immigrants who have been
terminated from SSI by the recent federal welfare reform law. The
elders welcome the students' efforts. But the food pantry staff,
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second-generation immigrants with European surnames and associate
degrees in human services, seem to distrust the law students' presence,
perhaps because the students go to a powerful university that does not
have a good reputation in this local world. The workers express their
feelings of distrust and the students get the message. The students
graduate from law school with hurt feelings about serving the poor.
o The scene is Accra, the capital of Ghana, in the year 2000. The
nation is still recovering from the decade of "structural adjustment,"
in which a bloc of "donor" nations required poor nations to unravel
what was left of their social service programs in order to get foreign
loans. A group of U.S. law students, most of them white, have come
to Accra to work with students from the University of Ghana's law
faculty on a health rights campaign in a high-poverty area of the city.
The 1990s brought spiffy new freeways, shopping centers, and five-star
hotels to central Accra. Yet the community of almost one million
people in which the students are working came out of the 1990s with
fewer public services than it had before structural adjustment policies
were imposed. Thus, there is little garbage pick-up, sewage disposal,
water treatment, or primary health care in this vast urban village.
Instead, the people tend to use traditional remedies for cholera and
tuberculosis and to defecate in plastic bags. The Ghanaian students
do not want to admit to ever having set foot inside this quarter, which
they refer to as a "slum." They have trouble understanding why rich
American students would come all the way to Ghana to spend time in
such a place unless the American students are spies, and they let their
feelings be known. The American students get the message,
reasoning that their Ghanaian counterparts cannot deal with poverty
in their own country because of class bias. The American students
have come to Ghana for the summer because it has become cool for
justice-minded U.S. law students to spend their summer vacations in
exotic places like Ghana, working with "indigenous" community
groups on human rights campaigns.
a A few days have passed. The Ghanaian slumlord who is renting
space to the indigenous human rights organization that is hosting the
American students informs his tenant that because white folks are
hanging around the group's office, a new source of money must be
somewhere in the picture and threatens to raise their rent.
a The scene is Harvard University in the Spring of 2001. Students
take over the Provost's Office to protest the university's refusal to pay
some of its custodial workers what the students consider to be a living
wage. Other students host conversation sessions with small groups of
the workers whose welfare the protesters seek to further. The leader
of the conversation project writes a paper that recounts repeated
moments during the protest in which eloquent, monolingual students,
impatient with the pace of simultaneous translation, eclipse the
workers' voices.
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a The scene is today and tomorrow. A group of single mothers
meet weekly with law students and teachers in a low-income
neighborhood in Cambridge, Massachusetts, to stave off the demons
of despair. The students invite the women to meet with the law school
seminar that wraps around the project. The women's words make it
clear that they are every bit as astute and articulate as these future
lawyers. The students get the message. They are gracious and
responsive, as their values dictate, but they are thrown off by the
women's eloquence.
They are uncharacteristically flustered,
awkward, and at a loss for words.
VI. LESSONS

When I started teaching law, I thought hard about how to teach the
theories and skills that lawyers need to work in the interest of justice.
I imagined young law school graduates moving into the profession
knowing how to use the law against the sort of inequality, exclusion,
and powerlessness that the law itself has helped to design. Thus, I
tried to create the appropriate pedagogical settings for this kind of
teaching project. I tried to erect the appropriate pedagogical
"scaffolding" to support this kind of learning. I sought assessment
tools that could ascertain whether good learning was taking place.
More recently, I have begun to ask different kinds of questions:
Why do some moments from my teaching seem to arrest me, sticking
so stubbornly in my mind? Does time really go around in circles, in
spite of the path of the law? And what about the interests of justice?
What have those interests been up to over the last several decades?
Why does the knot of inequality, exclusion, and powerlessness seem
so bound up with the question of justice and so resistant to it? Why
do I distrust questions that seem to presume their own answers?
Last spring, on the last day of one of my field-based courses, the
students asked me to say a few words about why I was teaching the
class and what I had hoped the students might learn from it. I talked
about a seminar that I had taken, while in graduate school, with the
French literary critic Roland Barthes.
In the first class of that seminar, Professor Barthes asked us to give
him words that we had fallen in love with. We vied with each other to
bring our favorite words to his attention as he wrote, furiously, on the
blackboard. Suddenly, he paused and began to circle the words from
the list that intrigued him. Those words became our syllabus for the
ten-week course. We spent the first three classes on caft, which, we
learned, was at once a beverage, a system for gender-ordering public
space, and a site of resistance to colonial hegemony. We then turned
to a word that he had chosen: addas. He told us that addas comes
from the Arabic language and means any word that means both itself
and its opposite, at the same time.
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By the end of that seminar, I knew I had learned something
important about undoing the knot of inequality, exclusion, and
powerlessness in the interests of justice.
We started the Accra health rights project with a week-long
seminar, in Ghana, for U.S. and Ghanaian law students. The students
worked together to design and facilitate the seminar, which probed
some of the intersections of economic policy, social and economic
rights, and democratic participation. One of the ground rules that
they set for themselves was that whenever someone spoke, she had to
address the previous speaker by name-a fairly simple rule. At the
end of the week, one of the students, from Ghana, said that he had
never before been in a classroom in which he felt that his voice was
taken seriously.
By the end of that seminar, I knew I had learned something
important about undoing the knot of inequality, exclusion, and
powerlessness in the interests of justice.

Notes & Observations

